I. Introduction
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113) that a right of personal privacy exists under the Constitution and this right includes a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The court also ruled that the right of personal privacy is not unqualified and must be considered against state interests in regulation. The court's decision did not end the public policy debate concerning abortion. At both the federal and state levels, this debate centers on whether taxpayer dollars should be used to pay for 7. There is empirical support for the hypothesis that residents' ideological preferences on abortion influence the restrictiveness of state abortion policies. For example, Meier and McFarlane (1992) found that states with a higher representation of pro-choice advocates among residents have a higher probability of funding Medicaid abortions. Medoff (1989) and Conway and Butler (1992) found that characteristics of the electorate have statistically significant impacts on the public demand for abortion legislation. 8. Other empirical evidence also suggests that abortion restrictions do not have a significant impact on abortion utilization. Johnson and Bond (1980) found that 17 abortion restrictions, including requirements for spousal or parental consent, requirements for consultations by more than one doctor, and facility requirements, had a statistically insignificant impact on the number of abortions per 1,000 live births in each state in 1976. Hansen (1990) found that abortion restrictions including requirements for fetal viability tests and prohibitions on the use of public facilities and public employees had a statistically insignificant impact on abortion rates in 1988. a negative impact on minors' abortion rates. However, the results of Lundberg and Plotnick (1990) suggest that parental involvement restrictions have a statistically insignificant impact on white teenagers' abortion rates.
Three limitations of this previous research on the impact of abortion restrictions on minors' abortion utilization should be noted. First, state abortion policies are continuously changing, and previous empirical analyses of the impact of abortion restrictions cover only a short period of time, in most cases one year.9 Between 1978 and 1990 11 states enacted and began to enforce parental involvement laws, and 13 states began or stopped public funding of medically necessary abortions for low-income women. Thus, previous research does not take advantage of this "natural experiment." The research reported in this paper is based on 11 years of state data and thus, the change in abortion demand in states which enacted and began to enforce abortion restrictions can be compared to the change in abortion demand in states which did not.
Second, many states have enacted parental involvement restrictions, but never enforced those restrictions or enforced them for only a short period of time. Previous research does not distinguish between enforced and unenforced restrictions. With the help of the legal department of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL), the exact dates of enactment and enforcement of parental involvement restrictions were collected, and thus this paper includes separate estimates of the impact of enforced and unenforced restrictions.
Third, the published research does not take into account unmeasurable taste factors, such as anti-or pro-abortion sentiment, and thus suffers from omittedvariable bias. Previous research attributes differences in abortion utilization to the presence or absence of abortion restrictions; however, it is possible that the state residents' ideological preferences on abortion determine both the restrictiveness of a state's abortion policies and the abortion utilization rate of the state's residents. In other words, there are fewer abortions in states with abortion restrictions; however, this may be because states that enact restrictions are states in which there would be fewer abortions anyway, such as Utah. In this case, finding a negative relationship between abortion restrictions and abortion rates does not necessarily imply that restrictions reduce demand for abortion. The econometric problem is that the abortion restrictions may be correlated with the residuals in an empirical model that excludes controls for unobserved abortion sentiment. Accordingly, in this paper the impact of parental involvement laws and restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortion on minors' abortion utilization is estimated using four methods to take account of the potential role of unobserved heteroge- Table 2 shows that 19 states reported data on the number of abortions obtained by minors for all 11 years, 1978-82, 1984-86, and 1988-90, while six states reported no data on abortions obtained by minors. The remaining 26 states reported these data for some of the eleven years. It appears that states that report these data are more likely to enforce a parental involvement restriction than states that do not report these data. Thirty-two percent of the states that report data for all years enforce a parental involvement restriction, while only 17 percent of the states that do not 10. Very similar strategies were used by Edwards (1978) to estimate the impact of compulsory school legislation and Saffer and Grossman (1987) to estimate the impact of beer taxes and legal drinking age legislation. 11. The Alan Guttmacher Institute collects national data on the number of abortions, but does not collect national data on the age of abortion consumers. The data sources are further described in Table 3 .
IV. Empirical Model and Results
The empirical model is similar to the model used by Grossman and Joyce (1990). They incorporate the decision of a pregnant woman into a model of fertility control and assume the probability of obtaining an abortion depends on the determinants of the optimal number of children and the spacing of births, such as family income, marital status, and the pregnant woman's level of educational attainment. Thus, the demand for abortions by minors in state; and year, (ABORTIONi,) is specified as follows: Medicaid funding of abortions. In addition, PROVIDERS/WOMENit, the ratio of abortion providers to women of childbearing ages, is included in an attempt to hold constant differences in time and travel costs of obtaining an abortion across states.12 Shelton, Braun, and Schultz (1976) have shown that the farther a woman has to travel to obtain an abortion, the less likely she is to obtain one. BORDERit, the number of states that share a border with statei and that have enacted and begun to enforce a parental involvement law in yeart, is included to control for the phenomenon of state border crossing by minors seeking abortions. Demand for abortions by minors in statei may be higher if minors from bordering states with restrictive parental involvement laws are traveling to statei to obtain abortions.13 The variables are further defined in Table 4 and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5 .
Equation ( The WLS coefficient estimates are reported in Table 6 and the fixed-effects coefficient estimates are reported in Table 7 . Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 The estimated coefficients on the proxies for abortion sentiment are either statistically insignificant or suggest that abortion sentiment is associated with higher or lower demand for abortions by minors. The proxy measuring the enactment of unenforceable state restrictions, REGS, appears to increase both ABOR-TIONS/MINORS and ABORTIONS/BIRTHS. Unfortunately, one cannot explain this surprising result by arguing that REGS is measuring state-level pro-abortion sentiment because one would expect there to be more restrictions in states with greater anti-abortion sentiment. The proxy measuring the presence of religious opposition to abortion in the state, BELIEF, appears to decrease ABORTIONS/MINORS, but increase ABORTIONS/BIRTHS. A possible explanation of this result is that increases in BELIEF may be associated with fewer abortions obtained by minors and fewer births to minors, but BELIEF is unrelated to the number of minors in a particular state.
If BELIEF, REGS, and %WOMEN STATE LEGISLATORS are not good proxies for abortion sentiment, then the foregoing analysis can be criticized for failing to take into account tastes and preferences for abortion or abortion sentiment. The third method employed to take account of the potential role of abortion sentiment (or the role of unobserved heterogeneity) in the determination of minors' abortion rates is to estimate a fixed-effects model with dummy variables for each state. These results are reported in Table 7 . Due to problems of collinear- between abortion demand and income and the positive association between abortion demand and the availability of abortion providers. There is a difference, however, in the estimated impact of MINOR-NOT ENFORCED. In the fixedeffects model MINOR-NOT ENFORCED appears to have a positive and statistically significant impact on minors' demand for abortion. Table 8 provides a summary of the estimated coefficients on MINOR-ENFORCED and MEDICAID-RESTRICTED. Cases 1 and 2 report the WLS results with and without the three proxies for abortion sentiment, respectively. Case 3 reports the fixed-effects model results using minors' demand for abortion as the dependent variable. Case 4 reports the fixed-effects model results using older women's (18 years or older) demand for abortion as the dependent variable.
The negative impacts of the enforced abortion restrictions on minors' demand for abortion are quite robust. Further, the negative impacts cannot be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity across states. Comparing Case 1 to Case 2 in Table  8 , one can see that the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on the abortion restrictions are not greatly affected by the inclusion of the abortion sentiment proxies. Looking at Case 3, one can also see that the fixed-effects model yields very similar results to the WLS model. MINOR-ENFORCED and MEDICAID-RESTRICTED have negative and statistically significant impacts on minors' demand for abortion. However, comparing Case 4 to Case 3 in Table 8 , one can see that these restrictions do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on older women's demand for abortion.
V. Discussion
The impact of state abortion restrictions on the demand for abortions is becoming an increasingly important policy issue as the number and types of state abortion restrictions that can be enforced in the United States are increas- The results in this paper suggest that the two abortion restrictions that were enforceable during the period 1978-90 decreased minors' demand for abortion services. Using four estimation strategies that correct for the problem of unmeasured state-specific variables, the parental involvement laws appear to decrease minors' demand for abortions by 13 to 25 percent, and state restrictions on Medic- aid funding of abortions appear to decrease minors' demand for abortions by 9 to 17 percent.
